Nudging financial and demographic literacy: experimental evidence from an Italian pension fund

A cura di:
Francesco C. Billari
Carlo A. Favero
Francesco Saita

Comitato per la programmazione e il coordinamento delle attività di educazione finanziaria

www.quellocheconta.gov.it

Nudging financial and demographic literacy: experimental evidence from an Italian Pension Fund

Francesco C. Billari*, Carlo A. Favero** and Francesco Saita***

* Department of Social and Political Sciences, Bocconi University, Carlo F. Dondena Centre for Research on Social Dynamics and Public Policies, and Nuffield College, Oxford, UK. Email: francesco.billari@unibocconi.it
**Deutsche Bank Chair in Asset Pricing and Quantitative Finance, Department of Finance, Bocconi University, IGIER and CEPR. Email: carlo.favero@unibocconi.it
*** Department of Finance, Bocconi University, Baffi Carefin. Email: francesco.saita@unibocconi.it

Abstract: In this article, we present and test experimentally a low-cost, Internet-based, financial literacy intervention program that we designed for implementation with the largest industrial pension fund in Italy. The program, *Finlife* (Financial Education and Planning for a Long Life) included: 1) an instructional video on financial, and demographic, literacy, provided online; 2) an experimental design that explicitly allowed to evaluate the impact of the online content on financial and demographic literacy, as well as on short-term behavioral changes; 3) a follow-up that allowed to assess the subsequent choice of investment lines within the pension fund. *Finlife* was designed to be a low-cost and scalable approach to increase financial and demographic literacy, consistently with a 'nudge' philosophy. Our findings show that *Finlife* delivered a substantially and statistically significant increase in financial and demographic literacy, as well as a push towards seeking more information on financial markets and choices related to financial planning, and becoming more active in financial decisions.

1. Introduction

In this article, we present and test experimentally, via an experimental design including a follow-up that allows to measure the effect on observable choices, a low-cost, Internet-based, financial literacy intervention program that we designed for implementation with the largest industrial pension fund in Italy.

Education is of crucial importance for our understanding of the world and for the shaping of society, and it includes numeracy and knowledge about the functioning of the world. The opportunity of living longer as a consequence of the demographic transition, increases the returns to education (Lee 2003). At the individual and household level, longer lives bring the added challenge of having to plan for a longer term. At the aggregate level, population aging – again a consequence of the demographic transition – with an increasing share of older individuals within the population, amplifies the economic consequences of planning decisions and the need for retirement planning. Moreover, there is a trend towards an increase in allowing for bigger personal financial responsibility, within a context of "increasingly complicated financial products" (Hastings *et al.* 2013). For all these reasons, financial literacy, i.e. the "ability to process economic information and make informed decisions about financial planning, wealth accumulation, debt, and pensions" (Lusardi & Mitchell 2014), and the awareness of the need to plan for the long term given the chances of living a long life – which we here call "demographic literacy" – are fundamental skills in preventing adverse financial, health, and social outcomes in later life for individuals and households, and allow to improve the ability of societies and economies to respond to the challenges of population ageing. Improving financial – and demographic – literacy should therefore be seen as a desirable and socially beneficial goal (OECD 2012; Hastings *et al.* 2013; Lusardi & Mitchell 2014).

The goal of achieving greater and widespread financial, and demographic, literacy faces however major challenges. First, while it is feasible, and highly desirable, to embed these elements of literacy within the mainstream education system and therefore target children and youth, there is a clear need to reach adults as well, in an efficient and effective way, as soon as possible. Indeed, the effect of longer lives on economies and societies are already visible in many advanced societies, and for the majority of the workforce, formal education has been completed. Second, in the provision of literacy programs cost efficiency counts. More specifically, when targeting adults in order to improve their literacy, sending a large share of the working-age population back to traditional education is not a scalable option. It is therefore paramount to find feasible, as well as relatively low-cost and therefore scalable, strategies to improve the financial and demographic literacy of working-age adults. In our contribution, we aim to explicitly address these two challenges.

The literature generally agrees on the desirable outcomes brought by financial literacy (see for instance the reviews by Hastings, Madrian and Skimmyhorn (2013) and Lusardi and Mitchell (2014)), albeit the majority of the studies are based on observational design and therefore provide evidence only on the association between financial literacy and outcomes. If we focus on working-age adults, individuals who are more financially literate are more likely to be actually planning for retirement (Lusardi & Mitchell 2007, 2009). Guiso and Jappelli (2009) show that higher financial literacy is associated with a greater propensity to diversify one's own portfolio. Von Gaudecker (2014) documents that lower financial literacy is related to higher return loss through lower portfolio diversification, and this holds independently on the sources of financial advice. Anderson et al. (2017) show that even the generally high-educated LinkedIn population, average financial literacy is actually low, with important effects of misperceptions on financial products. Van Rooij et al. (2011a) show that financial literacy is linked to wealth accumulation through two documented channels: first, an increase in the likelihood of participating in the stock market, and second, through fostering planning behavior.

For what concerns financial literacy programs, Bernheim and Garrett (2003) show, using a household survey, that the provision of employer-based financial education is associated with a higher propensity to save, both in general and for retirement. The supply of retirement seminars is more strongly associated with the participation in savings plan than the provision of written material, and this relationship is stronger for lower-income employees (Bayer *et al.* 2009). Participations to retirement seminars has stronger effects for women (Clark *et al.* 2006). While the evidence on the role of retirement seminars is cumulating, randomized designs are basically absent (Clark *et al.* 2015; Allen *et al.* 2016). Gamble and coauthors (Gamble *et al.* 2015) provide indirect evidence for the relevance of financial education for older adults by examining the effect of aging on financial decision making, and financial literacy declines linearly after age 60 (Finke *et al.* 2016). They find that a decrease in cognition is associated with a decrease in financial literacy. Interestingly, a decrease in cognition also predicts a drop in self-confidence in general, but it is not associated with a drop in confidence in managing one's own finances.

Some empirical evidence led a number of scholars to be more skeptical on the importance of increasing the financial literacy of adults. In a meta-analysis on the effect of financial literacy and financial education on behaviors, Fernandes et al. (2014), find that only a tiny proportion of the variance of financial behaviors can be improved by interventions, with a weaker effect for lower-income samples. Financial education tends to decay over time, and, according to Fernandes and colleagues, correlational studies tend to exaggerate the relevance of financial education. We here agree with Meier and Sprenger who, in order to address this skepticism, and to evaluate the effects

of educational interventions, suggest that it is essential to start from experimental designs, as voluntary participation in financial literacy programs is selective (Meier & Sprenger 2013).

Differently from the case of financial literacy, the evidence on what we have defined as demographic literacy and its effects is so far limited. Scholars have focused on subjective perceptions of survival (Hurd 2009). In the U.S., and among the older population, these perceptions are deemed generally consistent with population-level information (Hurd & McGarry 2002). Analyses of European data indicate that individuals are "to some extent aware of longevity risk" (Post & Hanewald 2013). However, there is no evidence on demographic literacy programs, nor on whether combining financial literacy with demographic literacy boosts the effects of financial literacy programs.

We present the results of the evaluation of a low-cost, Internet-based, financial and demographic literacy program, *Finlife*, which we designed for implementation with the largest industrial pension fund in Italy, with more than 400,000 members. Our approach was based on 1) an instructional video on financial and demographic literacy provided online; 2) an experimental design that explicitly allows to evaluate the impact of the instructional video and materials on financial and demographic literacy, as well as short-term behavioral changes; 3) a follow-up that allowed to assess the subsequent choice of investment lines within the pension fund. As a preview of our findings, *Finlife* delivered a substantially and statistically significant increase in financial and demographic literacy, as well as a push in behaviors involving a greater attention to financial markets and choices related to financial planning, and a greater probability of changing one's own investment line. Our experiment therefore shows that nudging financial and demographic literacy is an option. In addition to discussing and testing *Finlife*, our approach also contributes to the literature and to practice by bringing demographic literacy as a central piece in the discussion on long-term planning, which has mostly focused so far on financial literacy. Demographic literacy might contribute to a more effective financial literacy program as it allows to build on issues that are by definition immediately more visible to each individual.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our strategy and the setting of our study. In Section 3 we illustrate our program, Finlife, and our experimental design strategy. Results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes and concludes

2. The setting

How is it possible to effectively and efficiently reach higher desirable levels of financial, and demographic, literacy, for the adult population? As we already argued introducing this paper, while

there is evidence on the effect of specific education programs on behavioral outcomes, this is not yet conclusive (Collins & O'Rourke 2010; Fernandes *et al.* 2014).

Our approach builds on earlier results on programs targeted on adults. Bernheim and Garret (2003), as well as Lusardi (2004), showed that employees exposed to employer-based retirement seminars have larger average savings. However, Duflo and Saez (2002) found opposite evidence. Willis (2008) raised a critical and provocative voice, putting forward three arguments *against* financial education: 1) self-selection into program participation; 2) the lack of focus on behavioral responses in assessments of financial education; 3) the risk that financial education increases confidence to a too great extent, leading to the risk of bad decisions influenced by overconfidence. These critiques are important in informing our approach. We also build on the behavioral economics' "nudge" approach (Thaler & Sunstein 2008), in aiming to build a strategy that is relatively low-cost and yet effective, therefore maximizing efficiency. The low-cost approach is important, both in financial terms (as public finance is tight and employers are unlikely to invest huge amounts in financial education), and in terms of fast and large-scale deployability. Indeed, the Internet provides technological platforms that are efficient in terms of scalability.

We developed and run an experiment on workers enrolled with the "Cometa" pension fund in Italy. Cometa is a defined-contribution closed industry pension fund, devoted to workers of the engineering and plant installation sector. It has been established in 1997 after a collective agreement among employers' federations and trade unions, and it has been later extended to the sector of goldsmiths (who represent however a minority component - less than 0.4% of members at the end of 2014). Like most similar pension funds in Italy, Cometa does not manage funds directly but delegates investment choices to selected professional investment bodies (banks, insurance companies, and/or asset management companies). Since 2005, Cometa has set up multiple investment lines, each with different risk-return profiles, and each member of the fund can freely choose the line to invest her or his funds in. Importantly, the fund member has also the option to change the investment line subsequently. Our target population is therefore directly involved in actual decision-making about investment lines, at any point in time. At the end of 2014, before *Finlife* started, there were four investment lines, featuring different risk-return profiles, named "Monetario plus", "Sicurezza", "Reddito", and "Crescita". The basic feature of the four investments lines are described in Table 1.

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

In 2014, the overwhelming majority of Cometa members were in two "safer" investment lines, "Reddito" and "Monetario Plus". This situation was partly due to the fact that "Reddito" included

5

many workers enrolled before 2005, when there was only one investment line with a very similar profile. Then, since 2005 "Monetario Plus" has been the default investment line, i.e. the line to which new members were attributed in absence of an explicit choice. Data are in line with the literature both in the "nudge" tradition and in retirement savings that shows an inertial tendency to stick with default options (Benartzi & Thaler 2007; Beshears *et al.* 2009; Choi 2015; Brown *et al.* 2016). For instance, in 2014, 78% of the new members were enrolled in the "Monetario plus" line, which was the default choice, while 22% had opted for one of the other three lines.

In addition to choosing an investment line, members also have the option to make voluntary extra contributions, or to ask for early withdrawals. Early withdrawals (up to 75% of the accumulated fund savings) have to be motivated by either (a) health-related expenses due to very serious and certified health problems of the member or of close relatives, or (b) first-time home buying (for the member or her/his children). Moreover, up to 30% of the accumulated fund savings can be withdrawn without the need of a specific motivation. Early withdrawals for first-time home buyers and for other reasons are available only after at least 8 years of membership in the pension fund, while no such limits exist for health-related early withdrawals.

As of the end of 2014, before our experimental program started, the Cometa pension fund had a total of 408,797 members (407,321 from the engineering sector and 1,476 from the jewellery sector). Members include factory workers and mostly lower-level clerks/office workers ("impiegati"), while higher-level managers and executives have historically invested into different pension funds. The Cometa pension fund was the largest closed pension fund in Italy (as the end of 2014 it accounted for more than 21% of the population of all members of Italian closed pension funds).[1] Crucially for our design, about 140,000 of these members had accepted to share their e-mail with Cometa in order to receive periodic information and communication from the fund.

3. Program and Experimental Design

We developed an Internet-based, low-cost and scalable demographic and financial literacy program, and we designed a randomized experiment to test the effects of the program on a sample of factory and office workers within the Cometa pension fund. The main treatment of the program was a

---

[1] The size of pension funds in Italy was significantly increased in January 2007, as a law gave to employees the choice to invest their severance pay provision (known as Trattamento di Fine Rapporto, or TFR) in a pension plan (typically, an industry-wide pension fund such as Cometa). In absence of an explicit choice, the TFR would have been transferred from the firm to the pension fund, and invested by default in the lowest-risk investment line.

relatively short (less than 25 minutes) video lecture, administered via online streaming. To collect information on outcomes, we: 1) administered a follow-up questionnaire to test the effectiveness of the lecture in improving the understanding of demographic trends in life expectancy, of the basic finance concepts behind financial planning, and in increasing the willingness to acquire new information; 2) collected Cometa administrative data on subsequent financial decision-making by the members involved in the experiment. Furthermore, we studied the heterogeneity of the effects across gender, age range, education and job type. We discuss in turn the video, the experimental design and the questionnaire that allowed us to assess the outcomes of the program.

3.1 The main treatment: the video

The key treatment of the program is a video provided in streaming over the Internet. The video started by first giving evidence on the increase in life expectancy at 60 years over time in Italy. The video then went on explaining qualitatively the existence of an inverse relationship between life expectancy at the age of retirement and the amount of monthly public pension payments, as stated in Italian public pension law (Börsch-Supan 2005; Whitehouse 2007). Secondly, the video reminded that simulations on future pension payments could be obtained either through the Cometa website, or by reading the annual individual report received by Cometa. Thirdly, the video introduced: (i) the time value of money and of compounding over time, (ii) the difference in expected return and risk between bonds and stocks, and (iii) the main characteristics of the four different investment lines available to Cometa participants, also referring to the Cometa website. Fourthly, the effect of inflation, the difference between nominal and real returns and the concept of portfolio diversification were discussed. Finally, the importance of conscious long-term financial planning decision was recalled. Some very simple, non-technical, multiple choice answer questions were inserted between the different sections of the video, as a device to keep the viewer sufficiently active while watching.[2]

3.2 Experimental design

In order to text the effect of the program, we adopted a randomized experimental design by administering to a *treatment* group the video first and the questionnaire after, and to a *control* group the questionnaire first and the video after. All analyses have been conducted preserving the full anonymity of respondents while being able, through a unique code, to reconstruct respondents' key characteristics such as gender, type of occupation (factory vs office workers), age and education, and later financial choices.

---

[2] Two screenshots from the video are made available in the Appendix

The treatment and control groups were generated as follows.

1) We were allowed by Cometa to contact up to 28,000 individuals among the approximately 140,000 (out of the total of 408,797) members who had given their e-mail address to the pension fund in order to receive periodic reports and communications.

2) After excluding goldsmiths to ensure greater homogeneity, we used a stratified sampling approach that used the information available in the Cometa database along four dimensions. More specifically, we stratified: between factory and office workers; between genders (women account for less than 20% of the total number of members); among age brackets (20-39 years; 40-59 years; 60 years and more); among macro-regions of birth (aiming for instance at having about 5% of individuals born outside Italy). We allocated our maximum target of 28,000 individuals to each cluster based on these four dimensions, and then withiin each cluster we randomly drew the individuals assigned to the treated and the control group and, by difference, the individuals not involved in the project. The treatment group was given access to the post-video questionnaires only conditionally upon entirely watching the video.

3) The *treatment* group received, through an e-mail from the pension fund, an invitation with a link to access the short video. A member-specific link code allowed us to record individual access to the video and the attention was monitored by posing questions at regular intervals during the video. Two weeks after the administration of the video the treatment group was asked to fill in a questionnaire about demographic and financial literacy, and about their behaviour in term of acquiring information for pension planning in the last two weeks.

4) The *control* group was administered the same questionnaire as the treatment group, without having had access to the video prior to the questionnaire.

5) Invitations with the links to either the video or the questionnaires have been sent gradually to the different strata between June 2015 and early March 2016. Our dataset comprises all the questionnaires completed within April 15, 2016. We ended up with a final sample of 1,436 completed questionnaires, out of which 770 were from the treatment group and 666 were from the control group.

6) Between July and September 2016, six of the demographic and financial literacy questions have been also resubmitted in a second online questionnaire to those who have completed the video lecture and the first questionnaire. The median distance between the first invitation to attend the online video lecture and the second questionnaire is of 8.6 months, with 90% of observations between 4 and 12.6 months.

3.3 Outcomes: the questionnaire

The main questionnaire (see Box 1) was structured in two blocks, respectively covering demographic and financial literacy and attitudes and behaviours. In the former, three questions were asked on life expectancy at 60 years, its evolution over time and the relation between increasing life expectancy at 60 and expected pension payments. Nine financial literacy questions were then asked, reflecting the format of the basic and advanced literacy questions from Van Rooji, Lusardi and Alessie (2011b). In particular, we used questions on numeracy, inflation, interest compounding, the risk/return profile for savings accounts, stocks and bonds over long horizons, the relationship between expected return and risk, and the effects of diversification.

The question resubmitted in the second online questionnaire were six , selected from the demographic and financial literacy questions (namely, a2-change in life expectancy, a3-life expectancy and pension, a4-numeracy, a5-inflation, a6-interest compounding, a10-diversification 1).

The second section of the questionnaire (see Box 2) investigated behaviours and attitudes. The respondents were asked whether ,over the past two weeks, they had looked for information on savings and pensions, discussed savings and pensions in their family, discussed savings and pensions with colleagues, tried to estimate their expected pension using the Cometa website or reading the Cometa annual report, looked for information on the characteristics of the different Cometa investment lines.

We also added two questions to control for possible information received by INPS, the national social security service.

Box1: Demographic and financial literacy questions

a1. *Life expectancy* - In Italy, today, a man who is already 60 years old, could expect to live until... *(1) 79 years or more,* (2) between 76 and 78 years, (3) between 73 and 75 years, (4) 72 years or less, (5) Do not know

a2. *Evolution of life expectancy* - A man or a woman who is 60 years old in Italy has a life expectancy which is : (1) At least 2 years less than a 60-year-old person that lived 20 years ago, (2) Between 1 and 2 years less than a 60-year-old person that lived 20 years ago, (3) Approximately the same with a 60-year-old person that lived 20 years ago, (4) Between 1 and 2 years more than a 60-year-old person that lived 20 years ago, *(5) At least 2 years more than a 60-year-old person that lived 20 years ago,* (6) Do not know

a3. *Life expectancy and pension* - Given constant contribution at retirement what is the effect of an increase in life expectancy at retirement on expected public monthly pension payments ? (1) If life expectancy increases, the *monthly* pension payment increases, *(2) If life expectancy*

increases, the monthly pension payment decreases, (3) The monthly pension remains the same, because given the current law, it is independent from life expectancy, (4) Do not know

a4. *Numeracy* - **Suppose you have €100 in a savings account and the interest rate is fixed at 2% per year. After 5 years, how much do you think you would have in the account in absence of withdrawals:** *(1) More than €102,* (2) Exactly €102, (3) Less than €102, (4) Do not know

a5. *Inflation* - **Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account is 1% per year and inflation is 2% per year. After 1 year, how much would you be able to buy with the money in this account?** (1) More than today, (2) Exactly the same, *(3) Less than today,* (4) Do not know

a6. *Interest compounding* - **Suppose you have €100 euro in a savings account and the interest rate is 20% per year. After 5 years, how much would you have on this account in absence of withdrawals?**

(1) More than €200, (2) Exactly €200, (3) Less than €200, (4) Do not know

a7. *Expected return ranking* – **Which of the following assets has historically provided the highest return over a long holding period (from 10 years onwards)?** (1) Saving accounts, *(2) Stocks,* (3) Bonds, (4) Do not know

a8. *Risk ranking* - **Which of the following assets has historically displayed the highest fluctuations over time?** (1) Saving accounts, *(2) Stocks,* (3) Bonds, (4) Do not know

a9. *Risk-return relationship* - **An investment that has a high expected return is more likely to have a high risk: true or false?** *(1) True,* (2) False, (3) Do not know

a10. *Diversification 1* - **If you invest 1000 euro in stocks, is it riskier to invest 1000 euro in only one stock or 100 euro in 10 different stocks?** *(1) It is riskier to invest 1000 euro in only one stock,* (2) It is riskier to invest 100 euro in 10 different stocks, (3) Do not know

a11. *Diversification 2* - **When an investor diversifies his investment among different assets, does the risk of making a loss…** (1) increase, (2) stay the same, *(3) decrease,* (4) Do not know

---

Box 2 – Questions on Behaviour

b1. **Over the last two weeks, I looked for information on savings and pensions:** (1) Yes, (2) No

b2. **Over the last two weeks, I discussed savings and pensions with my family members:** (1) Yes, (2) No

b3. **Over the last two weeks, I discussed savings and pensions with my colleagues:** (1) Yes, (2) No

b4. **Over the last two weeks, I tried to estimate my expected future pension through the Cometa website or reading my annual personal report from Cometa:** (1) Yes, (2) No

b5. **Over the last two weeks, I looked for information about the investment lines of the Cometa fund:** (1) Yes, (2) No

3.4 Outcomes: financial choices

In order to collect information on financial choices, we subsequently gathered administrative information from Cometa. Given the centrality of default choices, we collected data on changes of the investment line within the first year after watching the video. As members of the control group were also given access to the video after they responded to the questionnaire, we had to define a different set of treated and controls for this outcome.

For this purpose, we defined the treatment group as including both members of the treated group, who watched the video and answered the questionnaire afterwards (which we label as "T1"), and of members of the control group who answered the questionnaire before watching the full video. We label this broader treated group as "T2". We then used an exact matching strategy (Abadie & Imbens 2006; Stuart 2010), whereby each member of T2 was matched to two individuals who were enrolled in the fund but were not involved in any stage of the experiment. The matching procedure resulted in groups of one treated (T2) unit and two control units (C2). Individuals belonging to the same triplet have the same age, gender, job qualification (blue vs. white collar), level of education, initial investment line ("Money Market Plus", "Growth" etc.). Matched individuals were allowed to serve as a match only once, and in case of multiple exact matching the individuals with the enrollment number closer to the treated individual were chosen. Despite this restrictive criterion, we obtained 923 perfectly matched triplets out of a sample of 1,140 individuals who could have potentially been used as treated units in a triplet (i.e. 770 participants assigned to T1 and 370 people assigned to the control group who watched the video after having completed the questionnaire).

4. Results

4.1 Descriptive Statistics

In the light of the description of our experimental design provided in the previous section, Table 2 provides the relevant evidence to evaluate whether our randomized treatment (the video lecture) actually depends on any observable individual characteristics. Our final sample contains a total of 1,436 individuals, out of which 770 were treated and 666 were not (we label this first treatment as "T1"). Table 2 reports mean values of individual characteristics for the total population and for the two groups and a test for the significance of their difference. We consider age, sex, place of birth and education along with variables describing the choices of individuals with respect to their contribution to the different investment lines made available by Cometa. In particular, we have information on the years of voluntary contribution, the choice of the investment line, the choice of contributing additional deposits and the exercise of the option of asking anticipated advances.

Overall, the evidence does not lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis of randomization although there are some exceptions. In particular, the share of "blue collar" workers in the control group is higher than that in the treatment group; the share of individuals with university degree is also slightly higher; (which implies that the percentage of white collar workers with university degree is significantly higher). There is also some evidence that members of the control group tilted their choice in favor of safer and lower return strategies with respect to riskier choices. On the basis of this evidence our regression analysis will include controls for all relevant characteristics.

[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

We first discuss the results of the regression analysis on the questionnaire, including the study of heterogeneous effect. Finally, we study the effect of the treatment on the choices of modifying the investment lines.

4.2 Regression analysis of the treatment effect

To assess statistically our treatment effect we consider a difference estimator within a system of linear probability equations. Given the availability of 1,436 answers to 16 questions, our baseline evidence is based on the estimation of the following system of linear probability models:

$$Y_i^1 = \beta_0^1 + \beta_1^1 X_i + \Sigma_{j=1}^{23}\beta_{j+1}^1 W_i + u_i^1$$

$$Y_i^2 = \beta_0^2 + \beta_1^2 X_i + \Sigma_{j=1}^{23}\beta_{j+1}^2 W_i + u_i^2$$

…

$$Y_i^{16} = \beta_0^{16} + \beta_1^{16} X_i + \Sigma_{j=1}^{23}\beta_{j+1}^{16} W_i + u_i^{16}$$

where the Y_i^k are binary variables that capture the correct answer to k-th of the 16 questions in the survey, the X_i separates the control group from the treatment group and the W_i are the controls for the 23 characteristics analyzed in Table 2. We do not impose any restriction, allowing both the unconditional probability of answering correctly and the treatment effect to be different in each of our questions, given their different nature. All controls that have a non-dummy nature are demeaned, so that the constant in each equation can be interpreted as the unconditional probability of giving the correct answer. The first group of questions is aimed at understanding the effect of the treatment

on the demographic knowledge, the second group on the financial knowledge and the third group on behavior/attitudes. The linear probability model is estimated at the cost of losing the possibility of sensibly approximating the nonlinear population regression function. In practice, the relevance of this potential cost depends on the number of extreme values in the regressors. We have checked the robustness of the results based on the linear probability model by considering an alternative *logit* specification, which confirms the baseline evidence.

Results of the system estimation are reported in Table 3. The statistical evidence for the effect of the treatment is uniform across all questions, with only three exceptions that refer to two questions on behavior and attitudes and a question on diversification. Question b2 aimed at knowing if the subject has discussed savings and pension in the family over the last two weeks and question b3 aimed at knowing if the subject has discussed saving and pensions with colleagues. In question a10 on diversification, the unconditional probability of giving the correct answer stands as high as .94.

Interestingly, the effect of the treatment is not of the same size across different questions and it shows up more strongly in three questions related to basic financial literature and one question related to the effect of an increase of life expectancy on the received monthly pension. The maximum impact of the treatment stands at an increase of .21 in the probability of looking for information on the different investment lines of the Cometa fund.

The significance of controls broadly reflects the patterns in the data traced by the descriptive statistics. We now analyze results disaggregating by the different sections of the questionnaire.

[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

4.2.1 Demographic Literacy and Pension Payments (Questions 1-3)

The first two questions of our survey are aimed at evaluating the knowledge of expected residual life at the age of 60 years and its evolution over the last 20 years, while the third question investigates the knowledge of the relation between life expectancy at 60 and the expected pension payments. In the first two questions, the unconditional probability of answering correctly stands at .58 and .73 respectively, this probability is little affected by the controls and the treatment raises it significantly by .056 and .078. In the third question the average probability of answering correctly is .30, which is raised by .217 in case of the presence of a university degree and by .173 by the treatment. Interestingly, the null hypothesis that the effect of the treatment is not significantly different from that of the university degree cannot be rejected. The third question is also particularly

relevant since it checks whether workers have understood or not that after a series of public pension reforms the monthly amount of the public pension at retirement is calculated based on life expectancy at the time of retirement, using mortality tables that are automatically updated. Hence, an increase in life expectancy translates into a lower monthly public pension, everything else being equal. Understanding this critical feature of the public pension system may help motivating individuals to improve their financial planning for retirement.

4.2.2 Financial Literacy: interest compounding, inflation, risk, returns and diversification (Questions 4-11)

Questions 4-6 are designed to assess the basic financial literacy with respect to compounding and nominal versus real interest rates. We assess numeracy and interest compounding ability (respectively in question 4 and 6), while question 5 investigates the ability to distinguish between nominal and real returns. In all these questions we use a wording very similar to the ones devised for the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) by Lusardi and Mitchell (2007). Question 7 and 8 assess the knowledge of the first two moments of the distribution of returns on stock, bonds and saving accounts, question 9 concentrates on the risk-return relationship, while question 10 and 11 deal with diversification and its impact on risk.

An interesting benchmark to evaluate the answers to all these questions is the one provided by the financial literacy tests included in the 2006 and 2008 SHIW (Survey on Household Income and Wealth) run by the Bank of Italy. Every two years, through the Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), the Bank of Italy collects detailed data on household demographics, consumption, income, and wealth for a representative sample of the Italian population[3]. In the 2006 and 2008 waves, an extra module on financial literacy was administered to about half of the sample (3,992 households whose head was born on an even year). The module included questions on interest compounding, inflation, risk diversification (based, as our question 10, on the choice between an individual stock and a stock mutual fund) and stocks ("Imagine that you have only equity funds and the stock market price fall. Are you i)Better off ii)Worse off iii)As well off as before iv) don't know"). The analysis of the SHIW answers conducted by Fornero and Monticone (2011) revealed that 40 per cent of the interviewed gives a correct answer to the interest compounding question. The share of correct answers raised to 60 per cent in the real vs nominal interest rate question; 45 per cent of the whole sample indicated correctly that holding shares of a single company is riskier than diversifying across several companies. Finally, 51 per cent was able to correctly pin down the effect of a fall in the stock on equity funds. The statistical evidence indicated a gender gap in financial literacy, a monotonically increasing relationship between

---

[3] See http://www.bancaditalia.it/statistiche/tematiche/indagini-famiglie-imprese/bilanci-famiglie/documentazione/index.html

the level of education and financial literacy and significant regional disparities between the North and the South of the country.

Our evidence show that the level of financial literacy in our sample is in general higher with respect to that of the SHIW as reported by Fornero and Monticone, and that the treatment uniformly raises the probability of answering correctly. Interestingly the only financial question in which the probability of answering correctly is lower than 50 per cent, independently from the treatment is the one on the long-run returns from investing in shares. The comparison of our data with those of the SHIW suggests that the financial crisis has increased the interest of the public for basic financial concepts but it has also generated a pessimistic view on stock market returns. We also find statistical evidence for a gender gap, a monotonically increasing relationship between the level of education and financial literacy and significant regional disparities between the North and the South of the country.

In particular, in questions 4-6 , that assess the basic financial literacy with respect to compounding and nominal versus real interest rates, the average probability of answering correctly is .7 which is raised by .12 in case of the presence of a university degree and by .11 by the treatment. Again the null that the treatment effect is not significantly different from that of a university degree cannot be rejected. The particularly strong effect in question 6 that deals with capturing the effects of discrete compounding can be particularly relevant, since the failure in understanding it may lead young individuals to underestimate the risk that maintaining very low risk, low return investments despite a long investment horizons may result in insufficient payments from the industry pension fund after retirement.

 Question 7-11 assess financial literacy with respect to expected returns and risk. Here estimates for questions 7 that concentrates on expected returns are very different from those for the other three questions that concentrate on risk. In question 7 which assesses the knowledge about long run returns the average probability of answering correctly is slightly above .5 and it is drastically raised by about .2 by the treatment. Answers on the risk of different types of investment produce a much higher unconditional probability of being correct, slightly above.85. The effect of the treatment is still significant here, albeit small at an average marginal effect (.03). The treatment is not significant in the case of question 10 (which is on the impact of diversification on risk) where the probability of answering correctly unconditionally stands at .95. Interestingly the location dummy has a significant effect in that respondent of the South have a lower probability of assessing correctly risk (with a reduction in probability of answering correctly that ranges from -.05 to -.08 being always significantly different from zero).

4.2.3 Attitudes and behavior (Questions 12-16)

Questions 12-16 concentrate on attitudes and behavior, assessing, with reference to the behavior in the last two weeks, the general interest for saving and pensions (Q12), the frequency of discussion on savings and pensions with family members (Q13) and colleagues (Q14), whether the respondent had tried to estimate his or her future pension through the Cometa website or the Cometa annual individual report (Q15), and whether the respondent had looked for information on the different investment lines offered by the Cometa fund (Q16).

The answers reveal an interesting pattern: the treatment does not push individuals to discuss about pensions within the family or with colleagues, but it significantly and strongly pushes to look for more information on pensions in general, on the specific forecast of pension payments that the individual may obtain in the future and on the differences among the investment lines of the pension fund. The remarkable effect of the treatment in moving individuals to look for information about the four different investment lines of Cometa (the coefficient is .221, while the constant is.131) in the two weeks after the video is particularly important considering the tendency of many workers to stick ot the default investment line. This (non-) choice is often likely to hide the unwillingness to gather information or the inability to take a conscious decision for the long-run risk-return profile of their pension investment.

4.3 Does the treatment effect depend on individual characteristics ?

The baseline results discussed in the previous section provide confirmatory evidence of previous results on financial literacy in Italy and new evidence of the statistical impact of the nudging action implemented in our experiments on financial and demographic literacy. In particular, we find statistical evidence for a gender gap, a monotonically increasing relationship between the level of education and financial/demographic literacy, as well as significant regional disparities between the North and the South of the country and a uniformly significant coefficient on the treatment for nearly all the questions in our survey. In the light of this evidence, it is interesting to assess if the effect of the treatment is related to the heterogeneous initial level of literacy. To this end, we estimate a richer specification by augmenting our initial system with interactions between the treatment and the significant individual dummies. The results of the SURE estimation of the extended linear probability model are reported in Table 4.

Our results strongly indicate that the effect of the treatment is not affected by the individual characteristics that generate heterogeneity in financial literacy. In fact, the interaction between treatment and the dummies that capture heterogeneity due to gender, education, and geographical location are jointly not significantly different from zero. Moreover, if we consider the four cases in which an

interaction is significant at least at the 5 per cent level (university degree in questions 1 and 6, South in question 8 and white collar in question 9). The effect goes in the direction of *reducing* rather than increasing the literacy gap among the subgroups having different ex ante levels of literacy. The only case in which the positive effect of the treatment is more positive for university degree holders is in the behavior question checking whether more information has been looked for about the different investment lines of the fund. Even in this case the treatment effect remains significant also for the overall sample. Apart from these exceptions, nudging seem to work uniformly for agents heterogeneous with respect to many characteristics and with a very heterogeneous pre-treatment level of financial literacy.

[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]

4.4 Does the treatment effect last in time?

To assess the lasting effect of our nudging experiment, we exploited the evidence from a second questionnaire administered on-line about nine monhs after the first questionnaire to those who have completed the video lecture and the first questionnaire. The second questionnaire focused on a subset of questions, namely six of the demographic and financial literacy questions (namely, a2-change in life expectancy, a3-life expectancy and pension, a4-numeracy, a5-inflation, a6-interest compounding, a10-diversification 1) . We rerun our model with interactions using as treatment group the respondents to the second questionnaire (results are shown in Table 5). The evidence rejects the null of a temporary effect of the nudging experiment. For five of the six questions the impact of the treatment is statistically significant, the only exception being the question on life expectancy. Interestingly the long-term effect of the treatment is more uniform than the short-run impact. We also checked whether the distance between the invitation to participate to the video and the completion of the second questionnaire has an impact on the probability of answering correctly. For the five questions for which the treatment proved to be significant even in the follow up questionnaire the interaction between the treatment and the demeaned distance between the video and the second questionnaire is not statistically significant.

[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]

4.5. Robustness checks

A potential threat to the internal validity of results is posed by attrition, which might have acted differently on the treatment and control group, thus leading to an overestimation of the treatment effect on literacy and active behaviors. In fact, one may argue that the participants assigned to the

treatment group, who had to watch the entire video before accessing the questionnaire, might have had a stronger motivation than people in the control group (who immediately found the questionnaire) would have found it easier to complete the task. This difference in motivation and engagement could justify a positive difference in the probability of giving correct answers between the treatment and the control group, and it deserves further attention.

In order to address this shortcoming, we exploit the fact that the control group was invited to watch the video after completing the questionnaire, and 370 participants out of 666 (i.e. 56%) seized the opportunity. Therefore, we repeat the analysis comparing the 770 treated units to the 370 people from the control group who watched the video after having completed the questionnaire. This restricted sample should not display differences in interest for the topic or accuracy in filling the questionnaire.

The results are presented in Table 6. In spite of the smaller sample size, most of the coefficients remain significant, and effect sizes are comparable with the ones previously described. In particular, all the questions about demographic knowledge remain significant with comparable effects. The same holds for financial literacy questions, most of which remain significant, except the ones on risk and diversification. As for the questions on behaviors, the treatment effect on the propensity to look for information and estimate one's own pension remains significant and comparable in size, while we find again no effect on the propensity to discuss about those matters with family members or colleagues.

Table 7 shows the estimates with interactions. This time, the smaller sample size undermines the possibility to obtain precise estimates for all the coefficients. Still, the coefficients on behaviours remain significant, as well as those of four financial literacy questions. Treated graduates are more likely to collect information on investment lines than treated units without a university degree, which widens the information gap. However, many other significant interaction terms close initial gaps, especially the disadvantages associated to gender and to the lack of a university degree.

[TABLE 6-7 ABOUT HERE]

4.6 The treatment effect on actual financial choices

We measure the effect of the treatment on observable choices by investigating whether our financial and demographic literacy program affected the investment and saving decisions of participants in the experiment. The outcome of interest is the probability of changing investment line within 3

months of watching the video[4]. We choose a relatively narrow time interval in order to observe a behavioural response stimulated by treatment and not by other concurrent drivers; however, the results are robust when a 12-month time window is considered (see later). We first present some descriptive evidence in the form of a transition matrix, and then estimate a linear probability model that exploits variation within triplets. The baseline model is the following:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \sum_{j=1}^{4} \beta_j C_{ij} X_i + \underline{\beta_5'}\underline{w} + \underline{\beta_6'}\underline{X_i'}\underline{w} + FE(Triplet_i) + u_i$$

where Y_i is the probability of changing investment line within 3 months, C_{ij} takes value 1 if individual i was originally in investment line j, X_i equals unity if individual i was treated (i.e. watched the video), $\underline{w}$ is a vector of controls, some of which are demeaned for the sake of interpretation.

We start with a description of the transition matrix (Table 8). By looking at the aggregate matrix, one can see that the probability to switch is less than 1 per cent for members who have chosen one of the three investment lines with the highest risk-return profiles, while it is equal to 3.6 per cent for those originally assigned to the safest investment line (i.e. "Money Market Plus", which was the default choice until February 2017). Interestingly, this unconditional probability observed over a three-month period of switching from the safest to the riskier investment lines matches that observed over the two year period 2015-16[5]. Focusing on the subjects enrolled therein, the probability to change is as low as 0.6 per cent in the control group, while it is as large as 9.6 per cent for treated units. Approximately 60 per cent of changing subjects opt for "Income", with a medium-high level of risk-return, 30 per cent select "Growth", with the highest level of risk-return, whereas the remaining 10 per cent pick a moderate level of risk-return, choosing "Safety". As for the other investment lines, we note that there are virtually no switches to safer investment profiles. Overall, descriptive analysis seems to suggest that the video stimulates people to reconsider their investment decisions, in particular by pushing people in a default line to select a more suitable profile, which can offer higher returns.

[TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE]

We now turn to the estimates of the linear probability model, displayed in Table 9. The regressors included in the baseline model, shown in Column 1, are the interactions between treatment (T2) and

---

[4] For control units, we look at the probability of switching in the same time window as the matched treated unit.
[5] Data on the switches over the two-year horizon are not included in Table 8 but they are available upon request.

investment line, and controls for job qualification, gender, age (demeaned), level of education, macro-region of birth and investment line. The estimated effects indicate that the probability that treated people initially enrolled in the default investment line switch is 9.04 per cent higher than for the matched control units. This coefficient is significant at the 1 per cent level, and it is consistent with the previously discussed evidence from the transition matrix. Then, the treatment effect for people initially enrolled in "Income" is 1.18 per cent, significant at 10 per cent, while we do not find any significant effect for the other investment lines, "Safety" and "Growth". Column 2 allows for a quadratic relationship between age and the dependent variable, adding the square of the demeaned age among the regressors. However, this term turns out not to be significant and the other coefficients are unaffected, so the subsequent analysis assumes a linear effect of age.

Since investment strategies - and the consequent decision to switch – should vary with individuals' time horizon, column 3 adds an interaction term between treatment and age (demeaned), to test whether treatment triggers different behaviors across age categories. However, the interaction Treatment*Age is not significant, while the coefficient on Treated*Money Market Plus declines to .086 and the one on Treated*Income increases to .0135. Column 4 includes interactions between treatment and all the controls (i.e. demeaned age, gender, job qualification, level of education and macro-region of birth), in order to extensively test for differences in treatment effectiveness across population subgroups. The interaction terms are not statistically significant, and the treatment effect for people in the "Income" investment line loses significance, whereas the treatment effect for units in the default line equals 0.0746 and it remains significant at the 1 per cent level. Column 5 includes additional controls related to people's past investment decisions: a dummy variable for voluntary extra contributions to the fund, years of contribution (demeaned), and the number of early withdrawals (demeaned). Here again, the only significant effect is that of treatment on people in the default investment line, and it equals .0749. While this evidence suggests a strong significance of such effect, the lack of significance of the other interactions might also be due to the small sample size, or to the absence of an effect for people who have already chosen more complex investment profiles.

In order to address this issue, Column 6 tests for heterogeneity in treatment effects by age only for those originally enrolled in the default line. Both Treatment*Money Market Plus and the three-way interaction are significant at any conventional confidence level, and the effect is substantial: the probability of switching to riskier investment profiles for a person with average age (44.4 years in our sample) is 6.36 per cent, and it decreases by 0.342 per cent for every additional year of age. As an example, the value of the probability is close to 11.3 per cent for a 30-year-old, and it drops to about 1 per cent for a 60-year-old. This finding is interesting, in that only younger people, who have

a longer investment horizon than those about to retire, prefer investments with higher volatility and return. Column 7 presents the same model, with additional controls for past investment decisions. Coefficients are significant for people originally enrolled in Money Market Plus: the effect at mean age is estimated at 6.40 per cent, and the three-way interaction suggests a decline by.338 per cent per year of age.

[TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE]

Finally, as a robustness check, we repeated the analysis by considering the probability of switching investment line within 12 months of watching the video. The results (shown in Table 9) are similar to the ones previously obtained. The probability of switching is estimated at 11.6 per cent for individuals originally enrolled in "Money Market Plus", while it equals 1.6 per cent for people enrolled in "Income". When interaction terms between treatment and controls are added, the interaction Treated*Money Market Plus is significant, and the effect size is 9.1 per cent, and effects are significantly stronger for individuals with a high school degree and born outside Italy. Finally, interacting treatment with enrolment in the default line and with demeaned age yields an effect equal to 7.58 per cent for a person with average age, and a 0.48 per cent decline for every additional year of age. For ease of interpretation, the estimated effect is at 14.5 per cent for a 30-year-old, and at 0.1 per cent for a 60-year-old.

[TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE]

6. Conclusions

In this paper we described the introduction of a new, Internet-based, financial education program, *Finlife* (Financial Education and Planning for a Long Life), discussed its implementation and experimental evaluation. Our approach was based on 1) an instructional video and materials provided through the Internet; 2) an experimental design that explicitly allows to evaluate the impact of the instructional video and materials on financial and demographic literacy, as well as short-term behavioral changes; 3) a follow-up that allowed to assess the subsequent choice of investment lines within the pension fund.

Finlife was designed to be a low-cost, easily scalable approach to increase the financial and demographic literacy of adults enrolled in a pension fund. Given its ease of access and low complexity, Finlife was designed consistently with the "nudge" approach that has been introduced in behavioral economics. The importance of such a program is clear if we consider that even among pension fund members the percentage of individuals who invest in an investment line with more than 15 per cent of stocks was below 4 per cent at the end of 2014, and that only a small percentage has shown a clear understanding of a cornerstone of a recent pension reforms in Italy, i.e. the indexation of pension payments to average life expectancy at retirement.

The results assessed through our experimental design showed that Finlife delivered a substantially and statistically significant increase in financial and demographic literacy, combined with a push to put more effort in estimating an individual's pension and looking for information on alternative investment lines of the pension fund. Remarkably, our evidence also shows that this treatment effect was largely homogeneous among subgroups, proving to be effective also for subgroups with a lower ex-ante level of financial and demographic literacy, and sometimes reducing the initial gap among subgroups. Moreover, we provided some evidence that the treatment effect has remained significant even months after the treatment.

Secondly, we found evidence that the treatment has led to actual behavioral change, with particular strength for workers who adopted the safest investment line, that was the default option in case of no explicit choice. Considering both a 3-month and a 12-month horizon after the video lecture, we provided evidence of a significant effect on migration of workers towards higher risk, higher return investment lines. This effect was stronger for younger workers, who are precisely those for whom a very low risk-very low return asset allocation would be most detrimental over the long run.

Overall, our results speak in favor of the option of nudging jointly financial and demographic literacy and of bringing demographic literacy as a central piece in the discussion on long-term planning, which so far has been mostly focused on financial literacy. Demographic literacy might contribute to a more effective financial literacy program as it directly draws the attention of individuals on more visible issues (how long will I live after retirement?) and it elicits indirectly a stronger interest for their economic and financial consequences.

References

Abadie, A., Imbens, G.W., 2006. Large Sample Properties of Matching Estimators for Average Treatment Effects. Econometrica 74, 235-267

Allen, S.G., Clark, R.L., Maki, J., Sandler Morrill, M., 2016. Golden Years or Financial Fears? How Plans Change after Retirement Seminars. Journal of Retirement 3, 96-115

Anderson, A., Baker, F., Robinson, D.T., 2017. Precautionary savings, retirement planning and misperceptions of financial literacy. Journal of Financial Economics 126, 383-398

Bayer, P.J., Bernheim, B.D., Scholz, J.K., 2009. The Effects of Financial Education in the Workplace: Evidence from a Survey of Employers. Economic Inquiry 47, 605-624

Benartzi, S., Thaler, R., 2007. Heuristics and Biases in Retirement Savings Behavior. Journal of Economic Perspectives 21, 81-104

Bernheim, B.D., Garrett, D.M., 2003. The effects of financial education in the workplace: evidence from a survey of households. Journal of Public Economics 87, 1487-1519

Beshears, J., Choi, J.J., Laibson, D., Madrian, B.C., 2009. The importance of default options for retirement saving outcomes: Evidence from the United States. In: Brown JR, Liebman JB & Wise DA (eds.) Social security policy in a changing environment. University of Chicago Press, Chicaho, IL, pp. 167-195.

Börsch-Supan, A., 2005. From Traditional DB to Notional DC Systems: The Pension Reform Process in Sweden, Italy, and Germany. Journal of the European Economic Association 3, 458-465

Brown, J.R., Farrell, A.M., Weisbenner, S.J., 2016. Decision-making approaches and the propensity to default: Evidence and implications. Journal of Financial Economics 121, 477-495

Choi, J.J., 2015. Contributions to Defined Contribution Pension Plans. Annual Review of Financial Economics 7, 161-178

Clark, R., Lusardi, A., Mitchell, O.S., 2015. Employee Financial Literacy and Retirement Plan Behavior: A Case Study. National Bureau of Economic Research

Clark, R.L., d'Ambrosio, M.B., McDermed, A.A., Sawant, K., 2006. Retirement plans and saving decisions: the role of information and education. Journal of Pension Economics and Finance 5, 45-67

Collins, J.M., O'Rourke, C.M., 2010. Financial education and counseling—Still holding promise. Journal of Consumer Affairs 44, 483-498

Duflo, E., Saez, E., 2002. Participation and investment decisions in a retirement plan: the influence of colleagues' choices. Journal of Public Economics 85, 121-148

Fernandes, D., Lynch, J.G., Jr., Netemeyer, R.G., 2014. Financial Literacy, Financial Education, and Downstream Financial Behaviors. Management Science 60, 1861-1883

Finke, M.S., Howe, J.S., Huston, S.J., 2016. Old Age and the Decline in Financial Literacy. Management Science 63, 213-230

Fornero, E., Monticone, C., 2011. Financial literacy and pension plan participation in Italy. Journal of Pension Economics and Finance 10, 547-564

Gamble, K.J., Boyle, P.A., Yu, L., Bennett, D.A., 2015. Aging and Financial Decision Making. Management Science 61, 2603-2610

Guiso, L., Jappelli, T., 2009. Financial Literacy and Portfolio Diversification. In: Working Paper. Centre for Studies on Economic and Finance, Naples, Italy

Hastings, J.S., Madrian, B.C., Skimmyhorn, W.L., 2013. Financial Literacy, Financial Education, and Economic Outcomes. Annual Review of Economics 5, 347-373

Hurd, M.D., 2009. Subjective Probabilities in Household Surveys. Annual Review of Economics 1, 543-564

Hurd, M.D., McGarry, K., 2002. The Predictive Validity of Subjective Probabilities of Survival. The Economic Journal 112, 966-985

Lee, R., 2003. The Demographic Transition: Three Centuries of Fundamental Change. Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, 167-190

Lusardi, A., 2004. Saving and the effectiveness of financial education. In: Mitchell O & Utkus S (eds.) Pension Design and Structure: New Lessons from Behavioral Finance. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, pp. 157-184.

Lusardi, A., Mitchell, O.S., 2007. Baby Boomer retirement security: The roles of planning, financial literacy, and housing wealth. Journal of Monetary Economics 54, 205-224

Lusardi, A., Mitchell, O.S., 2009. Planning and Financial Literacy: How Do Women Fare? American Economic Review 98, 413-417

Lusardi, A., Mitchell, O.S., 2014. The economic importance of financial literacy: Theory and evidence. Journal of Economic Literature 52, 5-44

Meier, S., Sprenger, C.D., 2013. Discounting financial literacy: Time preferences and participation in financial education programs. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 95, 159-174

OECD, 2012. OECD/INFE High Level Principles on National Strategies for Financial Education. OECD, Paris

Post, T., Hanewald, K., 2013. Longevity risk, subjective survival expectations, and individual saving behavior. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 86, 200-220

Stuart, E.A., 2010. Matching methods for causal inference: A review and a look forward. Statistical science : a review journal of the Institute of Mathematical Statistics 25, 1-21

Thaler, R.H., Sunstein, C.R., 2008. Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT.

van Rooij, M.C.J., Lusardi, A., Alessie, R.J.M., 2011a. Financial literacy and retirement planning in the Netherlands. Journal of Economic Psychology 32, 593-608

van Rooij, M.C.J., Lusardi, A., Alessie, R.J.M., 2011b. Financial literacy and stock market participation. Journal of Financial Economics 101, 449-472

Von Gaudecker, H.-M., 2014. How Does Household Portfolio Diversification Vary with Financial Literacy and Financial Advice? The Journal of Finance 70, 489-507

Whitehouse, E., 2007. Life-Expectancy Risk and Pensions. In: OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers No. 60. OECD Publishing, Paris

Willis, L.E., 2008. Against financial-literacy education. Iowa Law Review 94, 197-285

Table 1: Investment lines of the Cometa pension fund.

Name of the investment line	"Monetario plus" (Money market plus)	"Sicurezza" (Safety)	"Reddito" (Income)	"Crescita" (Growth)
Investment profile	100% short-term bonds; 0% stocks	Minimum guaranteed return, maximum 10% of stocks	85% bonds 15% stocks	60% bonds 40% stocks
Number of members (end of 2014)	173,634 (42.5%)	58,057 (14.2%)	160,832 (39.3%)	16,274 (4.0%)

Source: Cometa.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics

Sample Size: **1436,** Treated Group Size: **770,** Control Group Size: **666**

Characteristic		Sample	Control	Treated	Difference	P-Value[1]
Age		44.48	43.84	45.03	-1.19**	0.0103
Occupation	% of "Blue Collar"	40.04%	45.95%	34.94%	11.01%***	0.0000
Sex	% of Males	70.68%	69.52%	71.69%	-2.17%	0.3683
Place of birth	Northern Italy	51.18%	50.30%	51.95%	-1.65%	0.5337
	Central Italy	23.54%	22.82%	24.16%	-1.33%	0.5530
	Southern Italy/Islands	20.68%	21.62%	19.87%	1.75%	0.4142
	Abroad	4.60%	5.26%	4.03%	1.23%	0.2676
Educational Qualification	Univ. Degree	23.33%	20.12%	26.10%	-5.98%***	0.0075
	High School	52.92%	52.55%	53.25%	-0.69%	0.7929
	Compulsory Education	20.19%	23.42%	17.40%	6.02%***	0.0046
	No School	3.55%	3.90%	3.25%	0.65%	0.5026
Years of Paid Contributions		12.62	12.39	12.82	-0.43*	0.0760
Investment line	"Monetario Plus" (Money market +)	20.68%	25.23%	16.75%	8.47%***	0.0001
	"Sicurezza" (Safety)	14.28%	14.86%	13.77%	1.09%	0.5532
	"Reddito" (Income)	48.47%	45.95%	50.65%	-4.7%*	0.0754
	"Crescita" (Growth)	16.57%	13.96%	18.83%	-4.87%**	0.0134
Extra individual contributions to the fund	No	97.21%	97.00%	97.40%	-0.40%	0.6416
	Occasional Extra Contributions	2.72%	2.85%	2.60%	0.25%	0.7667
	Regular Extra Contributions	0.07%	0.15%	0%	0.15%	0.2824
Anticipations	Total Anticipations	0.39	0.43	0.36	0.07	0.1275
	Anticipation for purchase of the first house	0.06	0.06	0.06	0	0.9527
	Anticipation for restoring the first house	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.2612
	Anticipations for Sanitary Expenses	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.4271
	Anticipations for other reasons	0.29	0.32	0.26	0.06	0.1493

1: Two-sample t-test with equal variances
*: indicates that the difference is significant at a 10% level of confidence
**: indicates that the difference is significant at a 5% level of confidence
***: indicates that the difference is significant at a 1% level of confidence

Table 3 – Linear Probability baseline model, first questionnaire

VARIABLES	a1	a2	a3	a4	a5	a6	a7	a8	a9	a10	a11	b1	b2	b3	b4	b5
	Life Expectancy.	Evolution. of L.E.	L.E. and Pensions	Numeracy	Inflation	Interest. Compound	Expected Returns.	Risk	Risk-Returns	Diversification 1	Diversification 2	Info on pensions	Discussion Family	Discussion Coll.	Estimate my pension	Info on invest.lines
Constant	0.582***	0.729***	0.300***	0.733***	0.807***	0.531***	0.510***	0.886***	0.930***	0.952***	0.783***	0.346***	0.514***	0.582***	0.208***	0.139***
	(0.0488)	(0.0406)	(0.0477)	(0.0355)	(0.0294)	(0.0442)	(0.0462)	(0.0236)	(0.0243)	(0.0207)	(0.0299)	(0.0490)	(0.0498)	(0.0491)	(0.0454)	(0.0452)
Treated	0.0561**	0.0782***	0.173***	0.119***	0.0524***	0.174***	0.196***	0.0344***	0.0537***	0.0154	0.0568***	0.121***	-0.0121	-0.0360	0.169***	0.221***
	(0.0261)	(0.0217)	(0.0255)	(0.0190)	(0.0157)	(0.0237)	(0.0247)	(0.0126)	(0.0130)	(0.0111)	(0.0160)	(0.0262)	(0.0266)	(0.0263)	(0.0243)	(0.0242)
Female	0.0347	0.0104	-0.0357	-0.0413*	-0.0403**	-0.126***	-0.0245	-0.0209	-0.0538***	-0.0129	-0.0227	-0.0324	0.0383	-0.0864***	-0.0361	-0.0471*
	(0.0290)	(0.0241)	(0.0283)	(0.0211)	(0.0174)	(0.0263)	(0.0274)	(0.0140)	(0.0144)	(0.0123)	(0.0178)	(0.0291)	(0.0295)	(0.0291)	(0.0270)	(0.0268)
White collar	0.0565*	0.0522**	0.0229	0.0581**	0.0632***	0.158***	0.00113	0.0548***	0.0316**	0.0134	0.0528***	0.0267	-0.000234	0.0245	0.0286	0.00403
	(0.0319)	(0.0265)	(0.0312)	(0.0232)	(0.0192)	(0.0290)	(0.0302)	(0.0154)	(0.0159)	(0.0135)	(0.0196)	(0.0321)	(0.0326)	(0.0321)	(0.0297)	(0.0296)
Age dev.	0.00281	0.00367**	-0.000271	-0.00466***	0.00366***	0.00294	2.74e-05	-0.00122	0.00108	0.00135	0.00251**	0.00668***	0.00391*	0.00510**	0.00177	-0.00179
	(0.00198)	(0.00165)	(0.00193)	(0.00144)	(0.00119)	(0.00180)	(0.00187)	(0.000957)	(0.000988)	(0.000839)	(0.00121)	(0.00199)	(0.00202)	(0.00199)	(0.00184)	(0.00183)
Age dev. Squared	-4.48e-05	-0.000226*	-0.000118	-2.31e-05	7.51e-05	-1.74e-05	7.94e-05	1.84e-05	7.16e-05	-6.20e-06	3.96e-05	0.000433***	0.000396**	-0.000231	0.000371**	0.000247*
	(0.000162)	(0.000134)	(0.000158)	(0.000117)	(9.73e-05)	(0.000146)	(0.000153)	(7.81e-05)	(8.06e-05)	(6.84e-05)	(9.90e-05)	(0.000162)	(0.000165)	(0.000162)	(0.000150)	(0.000150)
Univ. Degree	-0.0249	0.0664	0.217***	0.0998***	0.0651**	0.127***	0.117**	0.0286	0.0222	0.0454**	0.139***	0.0328	-0.0693	-0.119**	-0.0287	-0.0383
	(0.0489)	(0.0406)	(0.0477)	(0.0355)	(0.0294)	(0.0443)	(0.0463)	(0.0236)	(0.0244)	(0.0207)	(0.0300)	(0.0491)	(0.0498)	(0.0491)	(0.0455)	(0.0453)
High School	-0.0229	0.0207	0.0743**	0.0282	0.00473	-0.00358	0.00208	0.0109	-0.0268	0.0193	0.0841***	0.0126	-0.0284	-0.0153	0.0298	-0.00520
	(0.0374)	(0.0311)	(0.0365)	(0.0272)	(0.0225)	(0.0339)	(0.0354)	(0.0181)	(0.0186)	(0.0158)	(0.0229)	(0.0375)	(0.0381)	(0.0376)	(0.0348)	(0.0346)
No School	0.0218	0.0274	0.0951	0.0940*	0.0469	-0.0449	-0.0337	-0.0170	-0.0299	-0.0195	0.0544	-0.0609	0.000240	0.00764	-0.0420	-0.0204
	(0.0763)	(0.0634)	(0.0745)	(0.0555)	(0.0459)	(0.0692)	(0.0722)	(0.0369)	(0.0381)	(0.0323)	(0.0468)	(0.0766)	(0.0778)	(0.0767)	(0.0710)	(0.0707)
South	0.00443	-0.0450	-0.0434	0.00202	-0.0409**	-0.0364	-0.0433	-0.0605***	-0.0563***	-0.0456***	-0.0840***	-0.00376	0.0117	0.0436	0.00808	0.0941***
	(0.0338)	(0.0281)	(0.0330)	(0.0246)	(0.0204)	(0.0307)	(0.0320)	(0.0164)	(0.0169)	(0.0143)	(0.0207)	(0.0340)	(0.0345)	(0.0340)	(0.0315)	(0.0313)
Observations	1,436	1,436	1,436	1,436	1,436	1,436	1,436	1,436	1,436	1,436	1,436	1,436	1,436	1,436	1,436	1,436
R-squared	0.020	0.035	0.092	0.083	0.089	0.143	0.107	0.054	0.062	0.038	0.112	0.049	0.020	0.044	0.056	0.073

Other control variables are: a dummy for the birth in Central Italy or outside the country, dummies for investment lines and for voluntary extra contributions, years of contribution in deviation from their mean, the number of early withdrawals in deviation from their mean. Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients.
* p<0.1; ** p<0.5; *** p<0.01.

Table 4 – Linear Probability model with interaction variables, first questionnaire

VARIABLES	a1	a2	a3	a4	a5	a6	a7	a8	a9	a10	a11	b1	b2	b3	b4	b5
	Life Expectancy.	Evolution. of L.E.	L.E. and Pensions	Numeracy	Inflation	Interest. Compound	Expected Returns.	Risk	Risk-Returns	Diversifi-cation 1	Diversifi-cation 2	Info on pensions	Discussion Family	Discussion Coll.	Estimate my pension	Info on invest.lines
Constant	0.612***	0.725***	0.335***	0.735***	0.800***	0.514***	0.553***	0.897***	0.928***	0.944***	0.774***	0.353***	0.506***	0.623***	0.221***	0.172***
	(0.0534)	(0.0444)	(0.0522)	(0.0389)	(0.0322)	(0.0483)	(0.0507)	(0.0258)	(0.0266)	(0.0226)	(0.0328)	(0.0535)	(0.0546)	(0.0538)	(0.0498)	(0.0494)
Treated	0.000371	0.101**	0.116**	0.114***	0.0751**	0.201***	0.107**	0.0156	0.0711***	0.0302	0.0735**	0.123**	0.0129	-0.112**	0.145***	0.164***
	(0.0512)	(0.0425)	(0.0501)	(0.0373)	(0.0309)	(0.0463)	(0.0486)	(0.0248)	(0.0255)	(0.0217)	(0.0315)	(0.0513)	(0.0524)	(0.0516)	(0.0478)	(0.0474)
Treated x Female	-0.00400	0.0258	0.0685	-0.0307	0.0260	-0.0499	0.0337	0.0206	0.0484*	-0.0453*	-0.0152	0.00839	-0.0160	0.0420	0.0228	0.0468
	(0.0572)	(0.0475)	(0.0559)	(0.0417)	(0.0345)	(0.0517)	(0.0542)	(0.0277)	(0.0285)	(0.0242)	(0.0351)	(0.0572)	(0.0585)	(0.0575)	(0.0533)	(0.0528)
Treated x White Collar	0.0535	-0.0342	-0.00606	0.00626	-0.0431	0.0914*	0.0978*	-0.0119	-0.0749**	-0.00671	-0.00295	0.0123	-0.0315	0.0545	0.0431	0.00698
	(0.0593)	(0.0492)	(0.0580)	(0.0432)	(0.0358)	(0.0536)	(0.0563)	(0.0287)	(0.0296)	(0.0251)	(0.0364)	(0.0593)	(0.0606)	(0.0597)	(0.0553)	(0.0548)
Treated x Age dev.	-0.00385	-0.00729***	-0.00368	-0.000465	-0.00287	-0.00298	-0.000340	0.000116	-0.00266*	0.00158	0.000461	-0.0138***	-0.00463	-0.00648**	-0.00472*	-0.00625**
	(0.00306)	(0.00254)	(0.00299)	(0.00223)	(0.00185)	(0.00277)	(0.00291)	(0.00148)	(0.00153)	(0.00130)	(0.00188)	(0.00307)	(0.00313)	(0.00308)	(0.00286)	(0.00283)
Treated x Age dev. squared	0.000649**	0.000258	0.000730**	0.000278	-6.54e-05	-3.64e-05	0.000381	0.000211	6.88e-05	0.000132	-0.000117	3.83e-05	5.63e-05	2.83e-05	-0.000118	9.61e-05
	(0.000324)	(0.000269)	(0.000317)	(0.000236)	(0.000195)	(0.000293)	(0.000307)	(0.000157)	(0.000162)	(0.000137)	(0.000199)	(0.000324)	(0.000331)	(0.000326)	(0.000302)	(0.000299)
Treated x Univ. Degree	-0.173**	-0.128**	-0.0974	-0.0606	0.00239	-0.266***	-0.0357	-0.0497	0.0176	-0.0356	-0.0663	-0.0496	-0.0490	0.0613	0.0328	0.177***
	(0.0698)	(0.0580)	(0.0683)	(0.0509)	(0.0421)	(0.0631)	(0.0662)	(0.0338)	(0.0348)	(0.0296)	(0.0429)	(0.0699)	(0.0714)	(0.0702)	(0.0651)	(0.0645)
Treated x South	0.0722	-0.00263	0.0286	0.0137	-0.00254	-0.0122	0.00114	0.0721**	0.0162	0.00504	0.0657*	-0.0215	0.0252	0.0676	-0.0336	-0.0437
	(0.0639)	(0.0531)	(0.0625)	(0.0466)	(0.0386)	(0.0578)	(0.0606)	(0.0309)	(0.0319)	(0.0271)	(0.0392)	(0.0640)	(0.0654)	(0.0643)	(0.0596)	(0.0591)
Female	0.0335	-0.00987	-0.0772*	-0.0260	-0.0576**	-0.0970**	-0.0393	-0.0345*	-0.0851***	0.0113	-0.0157	-0.0445	0.0417	-0.112***	-0.0481	-0.0749*
	(0.0422)	(0.0351)	(0.0413)	(0.0308)	(0.0255)	(0.0382)	(0.0401)	(0.0204)	(0.0211)	(0.0179)	(0.0259)	(0.0423)	(0.0432)	(0.0425)	(0.0394)	(0.0391)
White Collar	0.0234	0.0657*	0.0256	0.0519	0.0857***	0.102**	-0.0492	0.0610***	0.0721***	0.0147	0.0526*	0.0145	0.0126	-0.00310	0.00614	0.00358
	(0.0449)	(0.0373)	(0.0439)	(0.0327)	(0.0271)	(0.0406)	(0.0426)	(0.0217)	(0.0224)	(0.0190)	(0.0276)	(0.0449)	(0.0459)	(0.0452)	(0.0419)	(0.0415)
Age dev.	0.00491*	0.00748***	0.00178	-0.00454**	0.00522***	0.00427*	0.000405	-0.00116	0.00257**	0.000313	0.00230	0.0142***	0.00634**	0.00911***	0.00447*	0.00188
	(0.00260)	(0.00216)	(0.00255)	(0.00190)	(0.00157)	(0.00235)	(0.00247)	(0.00126)	(0.00130)	(0.00110)	(0.00160)	(0.00261)	(0.00266)	(0.00262)	(0.00243)	(0.00241)
Age dev. Squared	-0.000426*	-0.000361*	-0.000560**	-0.000179	0.000116	4.66e-05	-0.000163	-0.000114	2.54e-05	-7.25e-05	0.000114	0.000421*	0.000373	-0.000280	0.000434*	0.000160
	(0.000254)	(0.000211)	(0.000248)	(0.000185)	(0.000153)	(0.000230)	(0.000241)	(0.000123)	(0.000127)	(0.000108)	(0.000156)	(0.000254)	(0.000260)	(0.000256)	(0.000237)	(0.000235)
Univ. Degree	0.0740	0.138***	0.270***	0.135***	0.0626	0.281***	0.138**	0.0564*	0.0101	0.0665**	0.177***	0.0603	-0.0416	-0.154**	-0.0476	-0.141**
	(0.0631)	(0.0524)	(0.0617)	(0.0460)	(0.0381)	(0.0571)	(0.0599)	(0.0305)	(0.0315)	(0.0267)	(0.0387)	(0.0631)	(0.0645)	(0.0635)	(0.0589)	(0.0583)
High School	-0.0200	0.0207	0.0759**	0.0289	0.00421	-0.00450	0.00483	0.0115	-0.0273	0.0189	0.0837***	0.0160	-0.0278	-0.0104	0.0316	-0.00125
	(0.0373)	(0.0310)	(0.0365)	(0.0272)	(0.0225)	(0.0337)	(0.0354)	(0.0180)	(0.0186)	(0.0158)	(0.0229)	(0.0373)	(0.0381)	(0.0375)	(0.0348)	(0.0345)
No School	0.0223	0.0264	0.0874	0.0941*	0.0465	-0.0388	-0.0370	-0.0170	-0.0327	-0.0190	0.0593	-0.0558	0.00338	0.0124	-0.0406	-0.0230
	(0.0762)	(0.0633)	(0.0745)	(0.0555)	(0.0460)	(0.0689)	(0.0723)	(0.0369)	(0.0380)	(0.0323)	(0.0468)	(0.0763)	(0.0779)	(0.0767)	(0.0711)	(0.0704)
South	-0.0353	-0.0474	-0.0635	-0.00519	-0.0416	-0.0266	-0.0447	-0.0994***	-0.0682***	-0.0470**	-0.117***	0.00281	-0.00310	0.00512	0.0243	0.112**
	(0.0476)	(0.0396)	(0.0466)	(0.0347)	(0.0287)	(0.0431)	(0.0452)	(0.0230)	(0.0238)	(0.0202)	(0.0292)	(0.0477)	(0.0487)	(0.0479)	(0.0444)	(0.0440)
Observations	1,436	1,436	1,436	1,436	1,436	1,436	1,436	1,436	1,436	1,436	1,436	1,436	1,436	1,436	1,436	1,436
R-squared	0.025	0.043	0.094	0.084	0.090	0.154	0.112	0.065	0.068	0.044	0.116	0.050	0.021	0.050	0.057	0.083

Other control variables are: a dummy for the birth in Central Italy or outside the country, dummies for investment lines and for voluntary extra contributions, years of contribution in deviation from their mean, the number of early withdrawals in deviation from their mean. Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients.
* p<0.1; ** p<0.5; *** p<0.01.

Table 5 – Linear Probability model with interaction variables, second questionnaire

VARIABLES	a2 Evolution of Life Exp.	a3 L.E. and Pensions	a4 Numeracy	a5 Inflation	a6 Interest Compound.	a10 Diversifi-cation
Constant	0.730***	0.349***	0.731***	0.807***	0.453***	0.933***
	(0.0505)	(0.0555)	(0.0437)	(0.0355)	(0.0541)	(0.0246)
Treated	-0.0595	0.0745	0.148***	0.0981***	0.164***	0.0312
	(0.0540)	(0.0594)	(0.0468)	(0.0379)	(0.0579)	(0.0263)
Treated x Female	0.121*	0.106	-0.00289	0.00691	0.00598	-0.0462
	(0.0625)	(0.0687)	(0.0541)	(0.0439)	(0.0670)	(0.0304)
Treated x White Collar	0.0952	0.0311	-0.0379	-0.0313	-0.00181	0.00129
	(0.0637)	(0.0701)	(0.0552)	(0.0447)	(0.0683)	(0.0310)
Treated x Age Dev.	-0.0104***	-0.00746**	0.00122	-0.00258	-0.000277	0.000378
	(0.00325)	(0.00358)	(0.00281)	(0.00228)	(0.00349)	(0.00158)
Treated x Age Dev. squared	0.000116	0.000486	0.000306	-7.82e-05	1.79e-05	0.000144
	(0.000328)	(0.000361)	(0.000284)	(0.000230)	(0.000352)	(0.000160)
Treated x Univ. Degree	-0.202***	-0.110	-0.0542	-0.0487	-0.171**	-0.0463
	(0.0731)	(0.0804)	(0.0633)	(0.0513)	(0.0784)	(0.0356)
Treated x South	0.0662	0.0487	-0.0205	0.0153	-0.0434	0.0254
	(0.0682)	(0.0751)	(0.0591)	(0.0479)	(0.0732)	(0.0332)
Distance in deviation	-0.000792***	-0.000253	-0.000158	-0.000157	5.73e-05	3.95e-05
	(0.000264)	(0.000291)	(0.000229)	(0.000186)	(0.000284)	(0.000129)
Female	-0.0127	-0.0773*	-0.0289	-0.0626**	-0.0922**	0.0116
	(0.0372)	(0.0409)	(0.0322)	(0.0261)	(0.0399)	(0.0181)
White Collar	0.0678*	0.0293	0.0663*	0.0934***	0.0911**	0.0149
	(0.0400)	(0.0440)	(0.0346)	(0.0281)	(0.0429)	(0.0195)
Age Dev.	0.00854***	0.00115	-0.00492**	0.00537***	0.00484*	0.000553
	(0.00238)	(0.00261)	(0.00206)	(0.00167)	(0.00255)	(0.00116)
Age Dev. squared	-0.000366	-0.000536**	-0.000172	0.000106	2.63e-05	-7.13e-05
	(0.000223)	(0.000246)	(0.000193)	(0.000157)	(0.000239)	(0.000109)
Univ. Degree	0.127**	0.276***	0.0995**	0.0600	0.298***	0.0773***
	(0.0581)	(0.0639)	(0.0503)	(0.0408)	(0.0623)	(0.0283)
South	-0.0524	-0.0663	-0.00752	-0.0448	-0.0416	-0.0506**
	(0.0423)	(0.0466)	(0.0366)	(0.0297)	(0.0454)	(0.0206)
High School	0.0153	0.0765*	-0.0115	0.000438	0.0167	0.0278
	(0.0380)	(0.0418)	(0.0329)	(0.0267)	(0.0407)	(0.0185)
No School	0.00974	0.0888	0.180***	0.0213	0.0841	-0.00368
	(0.0770)	(0.0847)	(0.0666)	(0.0540)	(0.0825)	(0.0375)
Observations	1,058	1,058	1,058	1,058	1,058	1,058
R-squared	0.060	0.103	0.086	0.096	0.137	0.040

Other control variables are: a dummy for the birth in Central Italy or outside the country, dummies for investment lines and for voluntary extra contributions, years of contribution in deviation from their mean, the number of early withdrawals in deviation from their mean. Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients.
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Table 6 – Linear Probability baseline model, restricted sample

The table reports the outcome of the baseline linear probability model relative to the restricted sample comprising (a) the 770 treated (T1) individuals and (b) only the 370 control individuals who have first filled the questionnaire and who have subsequently viewed the entire video lecture.

VARIABLES	a1	a2	a3	a4	a5	a6	a7	a8	a9	a10	a11	b1	b2	b3	b4	b5
	Life Expectancy	Evolution. of L.E.	L.E. and Pensions	Numeracy	Inflation	Interest. Compound	Expected Returns	Risk	Risk-Returns	Diversifi-cation 1	Diversifi-cation 2	Info on pensions	Discussion Family	Discussion Coll.	Estimate my pension	Info on invest.lines
Constant	0.552***	0.790***	0.337***	0.750***	0.794***	0.579***	0.568***	0.925***	0.955***	0.966***	0.842***	0.370***	0.555***	0.595***	0.167***	0.113**
	(0.0571)	(0.0464)	(0.0566)	(0.0389)	(0.0326)	(0.0506)	(0.0531)	(0.0250)	(0.0259)	(0.0216)	(0.0314)	(0.0580)	(0.0585)	(0.0580)	(0.0545)	(0.0545)
Treated	0.0633**	0.0626**	0.183***	0.106***	0.0523***	0.128***	0.167***	0.0212	0.0496***	-0.00201	0.0160	0.112***	-0.0392	-0.0168	0.180***	0.227***
	(0.0311)	(0.0252)	(0.0308)	(0.0211)	(0.0177)	(0.0275)	(0.0289)	(0.0136)	(0.0141)	(0.0117)	(0.0171)	(0.0315)	(0.0318)	(0.0315)	(0.0296)	(0.0296)
Female	0.0457	-0.00211	-0.0519	-0.0483**	-0.0550***	-0.122***	-0.0234	-0.0316**	-0.0404***	-0.0232*	-0.0388**	-0.0358	0.0470	-0.0831**	-0.0376	-0.0490
	(0.0329)	(0.0267)	(0.0326)	(0.0224)	(0.0188)	(0.0291)	(0.0306)	(0.0144)	(0.0149)	(0.0124)	(0.0181)	(0.0334)	(0.0337)	(0.0334)	(0.0314)	(0.0314)
White Collar	0.0561	0.0376	0.00680	0.0602**	0.0519**	0.146***	-0.00458	0.0437***	0.00705	0.0145	0.0471**	0.0362	-0.0289	0.0208	0.0358	0.0188
	(0.0359)	(0.0292)	(0.0356)	(0.0244)	(0.0205)	(0.0318)	(0.0334)	(0.0157)	(0.0163)	(0.0135)	(0.0197)	(0.0364)	(0.0368)	(0.0365)	(0.0342)	(0.0343)
Age dev.	0.00121	0.00161	-8.97e-06	-0.00484***	0.00243*	0.00207	-0.00120	-0.00151	0.000465	0.00167**	0.00231*	0.00463**	0.00279	0.00352	0.00148	-0.00257
	(0.00221)	(0.00179)	(0.00218)	(0.00150)	(0.00126)	(0.00195)	(0.00205)	(0.000964)	(0.000998)	(0.000832)	(0.00121)	(0.00224)	(0.00226)	(0.00224)	(0.00210)	(0.00210)
Age dev. Square	0.000178	-0.000155	-9.99e-05	5.75e-05	8.07e-05	-8.49e-05	0.000214	4.99e-05	0.000133*	9.44e-06	3.95e-05	0.000446**	0.000457**	-0.000229	0.000427**	0.000310*
	(0.000177)	(0.000143)	(0.000175)	(0.000120)	(0.000101)	(0.000156)	(0.000164)	(7.72e-05)	(8.00e-05)	(6.66e-05)	(9.70e-05)	(0.000179)	(0.000181)	(0.000179)	(0.000168)	(0.000169)
Univ. Degree	-0.0167	0.0106	0.211***	0.100***	0.0806***	0.139***	0.130**	0.0181	0.0302	0.0364*	0.114***	0.0370	-0.0668	-0.101*	-0.0210	-0.0122
	(0.0547)	(0.0444)	(0.0542)	(0.0372)	(0.0312)	(0.0485)	(0.0508)	(0.0239)	(0.0248)	(0.0206)	(0.0300)	(0.0555)	(0.0560)	(0.0555)	(0.0522)	(0.0522)
High School	0.0104	0.000186	0.0756*	0.0305	0.0129	0.0115	0.00966	-0.00257	-0.0216	0.0197	0.0734***	0.0176	-0.0260	-0.00994	0.0315	-0.00368
	(0.0430)	(0.0349)	(0.0425)	(0.0292)	(0.0245)	(0.0381)	(0.0399)	(0.0188)	(0.0194)	(0.0162)	(0.0236)	(0.0436)	(0.0440)	(0.0436)	(0.0410)	(0.0410)
No School	-0.0267	-0.0137	0.0882	0.0418	0.0453	-0.121	-0.117	-0.0287	-0.0547	-0.00746	0.0465	-0.0521	-0.0743	-0.0249	-0.0154	-0.0120
	(0.0888)	(0.0721)	(0.0879)	(0.0604)	(0.0507)	(0.0787)	(0.0825)	(0.0388)	(0.0402)	(0.0335)	(0.0488)	(0.0901)	(0.0909)	(0.0901)	(0.0847)	(0.0847)
South	0.00758	-0.0374	-0.0432	0.0178	-0.0234	-0.0299	-0.0646*	-0.0483***	-0.0673***	-0.0383***	-0.0529**	-0.00611	0.0206	0.0563	0.00625	0.0769**
	(0.0382)	(0.0310)	(0.0378)	(0.0260)	(0.0218)	(0.0338)	(0.0355)	(0.0167)	(0.0173)	(0.0144)	(0.0210)	(0.0388)	(0.0391)	(0.0388)	(0.0364)	(0.0364)
Observations	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140
R-squared	0.023	0.018	0.083	0.085	0.075	0.119	0.101	0.044	0.056	0.042	0.088	0.039	0.018	0.036	0.049	0.064

Other control variables are: a dummy for the birth outside the country, dummies for investment lines and for voluntary extra contributions, years of contribution in deviation from their mean, the number of early withdrawals in deviation from their mean. Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients.
* p<0.1; ** p<0.5; *** p<0.01.

Table 7 – Linear Probability model with interaction variables, restricted sample

The table reports the outcome of the linear probability model with interaction variables relative to the restricted sample (defined as for Table 5).

VARIABLES	a1	a2	a3	a4	a5	a6	a7	a8	a9	a10	a11	b1	b2	b3	b4	b5
	Life Expectancy	Evolution. of L.E.	L.E. and Pensions	Numeracy	Inflation	Interest. Compound	Expected Returns	Risk	Risk-Returns	Diversification 1	Diversification 2	Info on pensions	Discussion Family	Discussion Coll.	Estimate my pension	Info on invest.lines
Constant	0.561***	0.808***	0.423***	0.741***	0.790***	0.578***	0.639***	0.955***	0.952***	0.958***	0.843***	0.361***	0.553***	0.647***	0.160**	0.145**
	(0.0663)	(0.0538)	(0.0654)	(0.0451)	(0.0378)	(0.0581)	(0.0616)	(0.0289)	(0.0300)	(0.0250)	(0.0365)	(0.0669)	(0.0680)	(0.0673)	(0.0632)	(0.0629)
Treated	0.0451	0.0415	0.0588	0.120***	0.0647*	0.121**	0.0549	-0.0245	0.0552**	0.00947	0.0130	0.134**	-0.0381	-0.0974	0.191***	0.187***
	(0.0609)	(0.0494)	(0.0601)	(0.0415)	(0.0347)	(0.0534)	(0.0566)	(0.0266)	(0.0276)	(0.0230)	(0.0335)	(0.0615)	(0.0625)	(0.0618)	(0.0581)	(0.0578)
Treated x Female	-0.0230	0.0696	0.154**	-0.0154	0.0722*	-0.0728	0.0780	0.0562*	0.0142	-0.0359	0.0153	0.0219	-0.0461	0.0455	0.0330	0.0875
	(0.0697)	(0.0566)	(0.0688)	(0.0475)	(0.0398)	(0.0611)	(0.0648)	(0.0304)	(0.0316)	(0.0263)	(0.0384)	(0.0704)	(0.0715)	(0.0708)	(0.0665)	(0.0662)
Treated x White Collar	0.0469	-0.000939	0.0352	0.00117	-0.0168	0.163***	0.118*	0.0212	-0.0252	-0.00959	0.0261	-0.0199	0.0466	0.0801	0.0369	-0.0337
	(0.0712)	(0.0578)	(0.0703)	(0.0485)	(0.0406)	(0.0625)	(0.0662)	(0.0311)	(0.0322)	(0.0269)	(0.0392)	(0.0719)	(0.0731)	(0.0723)	(0.0679)	(0.0676)
Treated x Age dev.	-0.000852	-0.00622**	-0.00481	-0.00180	-0.000583	-0.00279	-0.000664	-0.000676	-0.00218	0.00147	0.000622	-0.0147***	-0.00405	-0.00488	-0.00507	-0.00940***
	(0.00366)	(0.00297)	(0.00361)	(0.00249)	(0.00209)	(0.00321)	(0.00340)	(0.00160)	(0.00166)	(0.00138)	(0.00201)	(0.00369)	(0.00375)	(0.00371)	(0.00349)	(0.00347)
Treated x Age dev. squared	0.000309	0.000222	0.000976**	0.000185	-4.80e-05	0.000387	0.000251	0.000251	-0.000128	0.000155	-0.000118	-5.29e-05	3.67e-05	-1.02e-05	-0.000516	-0.000152
	(0.000388)	(0.000315)	(0.000383)	(0.000264)	(0.000221)	(0.000340)	(0.000360)	(0.000169)	(0.000175)	(0.000146)	(0.000213)	(0.000391)	(0.000398)	(0.000393)	(0.000370)	(0.000368)
Treated x Univ. Degree	-0.168**	-0.0516	-0.108	-0.0781	-0.0315	-0.363***	-0.0383	-0.0603*	0.0148	-0.0241	-0.0333	-0.0546	-0.0834	0.0482	0.0133	0.172**
	(0.0818)	(0.0664)	(0.0807)	(0.0557)	(0.0466)	(0.0717)	(0.0760)	(0.0357)	(0.0370)	(0.0309)	(0.0450)	(0.0826)	(0.0839)	(0.0830)	(0.0780)	(0.0776)
Treated x South	0.0773	-0.0302	0.0505	-0.0304	-0.0571	-0.0419	0.0548	0.0661*	0.0482	-0.00176	0.00569	-0.0478	-0.00229	0.0275	-0.0475	-0.0137
	(0.0776)	(0.0630)	(0.0765)	(0.0528)	(0.0442)	(0.0680)	(0.0721)	(0.0338)	(0.0351)	(0.0293)	(0.0427)	(0.0783)	(0.0795)	(0.0787)	(0.0739)	(0.0736)
Female	0.0605	-0.0538	-0.163***	-0.0385	-0.104***	-0.0683	-0.0761	-0.0718***	-0.0528**	0.00181	-0.0478	-0.0596	0.0774	-0.116**	-0.0602	-0.116**
	(0.0584)	(0.0474)	(0.0576)	(0.0398)	(0.0333)	(0.0512)	(0.0543)	(0.0255)	(0.0264)	(0.0220)	(0.0321)	(0.0590)	(0.0599)	(0.0593)	(0.0557)	(0.0554)
White Collar	0.0208	0.0374	-0.0160	0.0564	0.0639*	0.0267	-0.0811	0.0302	0.0247	0.0193	0.0299	0.0457	-0.0639	-0.0306	0.0119	0.0459
	(0.0601)	(0.0488)	(0.0593)	(0.0409)	(0.0343)	(0.0527)	(0.0558)	(0.0262)	(0.0272)	(0.0227)	(0.0330)	(0.0606)	(0.0616)	(0.0610)	(0.0573)	(0.0570)
Age dev.	0.00183	0.00587**	0.00343	-0.00380*	0.00284	0.00361	-0.000431	-0.000832	0.00215	0.000504	0.00199	0.0146***	0.00547	0.00713**	0.00513	0.00413
	(0.00336)	(0.00273)	(0.00332)	(0.00229)	(0.00192)	(0.00295)	(0.00312)	(0.00147)	(0.00152)	(0.00127)	(0.00185)	(0.00339)	(0.00344)	(0.00341)	(0.00320)	(0.00319)
Age dev. Squared	-4.68e-05	-0.000304	-0.000823**	-6.06e-05	0.000117	-0.000334	5.36e-06	-0.000148	0.000222	-9.80e-05	0.000119	0.000527	0.000449	-0.000231	0.000809**	0.000424
	(0.000332)	(0.000269)	(0.000328)	(0.000226)	(0.000189)	(0.000291)	(0.000308)	(0.000145)	(0.000150)	(0.000125)	(0.000183)	(0.000335)	(0.000340)	(0.000337)	(0.000316)	(0.000315)
Univ. Degree	0.0989	0.0449	0.281***	0.154***	0.1000**	0.392***	0.156**	0.0577*	0.0192	0.0535*	0.136***	0.0757	-0.00723	-0.133*	-0.0296	-0.131*
	(0.0784)	(0.0637)	(0.0774)	(0.0534)	(0.0447)	(0.0688)	(0.0729)	(0.0342)	(0.0355)	(0.0296)	(0.0431)	(0.0792)	(0.0804)	(0.0796)	(0.0748)	(0.0744)
High School	0.0117	0.000274	0.0752*	0.0305	0.0102	0.0120	0.0101	-0.00252	-0.0205	0.0198	0.0727***	0.0211	-0.0238	-0.00755	0.0319	-0.00122
	(0.0429)	(0.0348)	(0.0424)	(0.0292)	(0.0245)	(0.0376)	(0.0399)	(0.0187)	(0.0194)	(0.0162)	(0.0236)	(0.0433)	(0.0440)	(0.0436)	(0.0409)	(0.0407)
No School	-0.0249	-0.0145	0.0728	0.0416	0.0394	-0.118	-0.122	-0.0324	-0.0495	-0.00921	0.0467	-0.0356	-0.0658	-0.0195	-0.00538	-0.00442
	(0.0890)	(0.0723)	(0.0879)	(0.0606)	(0.0508)	(0.0781)	(0.0827)	(0.0388)	(0.0403)	(0.0336)	(0.0490)	(0.0899)	(0.0913)	(0.0904)	(0.0849)	(0.0845)
South	-0.0421	-0.0200	-0.0832	0.0387	0.0141	0.00653	-0.102*	-0.0939***	-0.101***	-0.0365	-0.0554	0.0229	0.0242	0.0364	0.0392	0.0794
	(0.0650)	(0.0528)	(0.0642)	(0.0443)	(0.0371)	(0.0570)	(0.0604)	(0.0284)	(0.0294)	(0.0245)	(0.0358)	(0.0657)	(0.0667)	(0.0660)	(0.0620)	(0.0617)
Observations	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140
R-squared	0.028	0.024	0.093	0.088	0.080	0.141	0.106	0.053	0.060	0.046	0.089	0.053	0.020	0.041	0.053	0.078

Other control variables are: a dummy for the birth outside the country, dummies for investment lines and for voluntary extra contributions, years of contribution in deviation from their mean, the number of early withdrawals in deviation from their mean. Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients.
* $p<0.1$; ** $p<0.5$; *** $p<0.01$.

Table 8 – 3-month Migration matrix

The table reports the unconditional migration behavior of the treated ("T2") sample and of matched individuals over three months after the video lecture. Initial investment lines are reported on rows, final investment lines on columns.

			Matched sample					Treated sample				
			Final investment line					Final investment line				
			1-Money market	2-Safety	3-Income	4-Growth	Total	1-Money market	2-Safety	3-Income	4-Growth	Total
Initial invest-ment line	1-Money market	N	352	0	2	0	354	160	2	10	5	177
		% initial	99,4%	0,0%	0,6%	0,0%	100,0%	90,4%	1,1%	5,6%	2,8%	100,0%
	2-Safety	N	0	215	0	1	216	0	106	2	0	108
		% initial	0,0%	99,5%	0,0%	0,5%	100,0%	0,0%	98,1%	1,9%	0,0%	100,0%
	3-Income	N	0	1	935	0	936	0	1	462	5	468
		% initial	0,0%	0,1%	99,9%	0,0%	100,0%	0,0%	0,2%	98,7%	1,1%	100,0%
	4-Growth	N	0	2	0	338	340	0	0	1	169	170
		% initial	0,0%	0,6%	0,0%	99,4%	100,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,6%	99,4%	100,0%

Table 9 – Linear Probability model – Actual change of investment line (over 3 months from the video)

The table reports the outcome of the linear probability model where the dependent variable is equal to 1 for those individuals who have changed their investment lines over three months from viewing the video. The sample is composed by 923 triplets where one treated individual is matched with two control individuals with the same age, gender, job qualification (blue vs. white collar), level of education, initial investment line ("Money Market Plus", "Growth" etc.). Matched individuals are allowed to serve as a match only once.

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Constant	-0.00542	-0.0644	-0.0106	-0.00990	-0.00176	-0.00522	0.00160
	(0.162)	(0.292)	(0.162)	(0.162)	(0.163)	(0.162)	(0.163)
Treated x "Money Market Plus"	0.0904***	0.0905***	0.0860***	0.0746***	0.0749***	0.0636***	0.0640***
	(0.00983)	(0.00984)	(0.0102)	(0.0149)	(0.0149)	(0.0156)	(0.0156)
Treated x "Money Market Plus" x Age dev.						-0.00342**	-0.00338**
						(0.00144)	(0.00145)
Treated x "Income"	0.0118*	0.0118*	0.0135**	-0.000582	1.86e-05	0.00165	0.00224
	(0.00606)	(0.00606)	(0.00615)	(0.0126)	(0.0126)	(0.0126)	(0.0126)
Treated x "Safety"	0.00927	0.00939	0.0113	-0.00302	-0.00248	-0.00102	-0.000442
	(0.0126)	(0.0126)	(0.0126)	(0.0167)	(0.0168)	(0.0167)	(0.0168)
Treated x "Growth"	2.67e-05	0.000175	-0.00152	-0.0158	-0.0153	-0.0111	-0.0107
	(0.0100)	(0.0101)	(0.0101)	(0.0150)	(0.0151)	(0.0151)	(0.0152)
Treated x Female				-0.00590	-0.00575	-0.00604	-0.00593
				(0.0111)	(0.0111)	(0.0111)	(0.0111)
Treated x White Collar				0.000682	-5.71e-05	0.000867	0.000143
				(0.0112)	(0.0112)	(0.0111)	(0.0112)
Treated x University Degree				0.0106	0.0112	0.00557	0.00618
				(0.0171)	(0.0171)	(0.0172)	(0.0172)
Treated x High School				0.0183	0.0185	0.0150	0.0152
				(0.0136)	(0.0136)	(0.0137)	(0.0137)
Treated x No School				0.00967	0.00972	0.00317	0.00335
				(0.0303)	(0.0303)	(0.0304)	(0.0304)
Treated x Central Italy				0.00263	0.00246	0.00236	0.00218
				(0.0110)	(0.0110)	(0.0110)	(0.0110)
Treated x Southern Italy				0.00515	0.00527	0.00451	0.00460
				(0.0116)	(0.0116)	(0.0116)	(0.0116)
Treated x Born Abroad				-0.00610	-0.00457	-0.00885	-0.00741
				(0.0283)	(0.0283)	(0.0283)	(0.0283)
Treated x Age Dev.			-0.000868	-0.000742	-0.000751	-0.000196	-0.000213
			(0.000535)	(0.000557)	(0.000558)	(0.000602)	(0.000603)
Female	-0.00604	-0.0197	-0.0125	-0.0150	0.00171	-0.00793	0.00641
	(0.128)	(0.140)	(0.128)	(0.129)	(0.131)	(0.129)	(0.131)
White Collar	-0.0408	-0.181	-0.0841	-0.115	-0.0819	-0.0674	-0.0375
	(0.653)	(0.875)	(0.653)	(0.659)	(0.660)	(0.658)	(0.659)
Age Dev.	0.00151	0.00964	0.00340	0.00448	0.00364	0.00255	0.00180
	(0.0235)	(0.0410)	(0.0236)	(0.0238)	(0.0238)	(0.0238)	(0.0238)
Squared Age Dev.		-0.000358					
		(0.00148)					
Controls: education level (no school, high school, university degree)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls for area of birth (Centre, South, Born Abroad)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls for initial investment line (Money market plus, Safety, Income)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional controls	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Triplet FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,769	2,769	2,769	2,769	2,769	2,769	2,769
R-squared	0.356	0.356	0.357	0.358	0.359	0.360	0.361
F-test	1.098	1.096	1.100	1.092	1.089	1.100	1.097
Prob > F	0.0491	0.0518	0.0449	0.0592	0.0640	0.0460	0.0505

Additional controls: dummy for the birth outside the country, dummies for investment lines and for voluntary extra contributions, years of contribution in deviation from their mean, the number of early withdrawals in deviation from their mean. Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients.
* $p<0.1$; ** $p<0.5$; *** $p<0.01$.

Table 10 – Linear Probability model – Actual change of investment line (over 12 months from the video)

The table reports the outcome of the linear probability model where the dependent variable is equal to 1 for those individuals who have changed their investment lines over twelve months from viewing the video. The sample is composed by 923 triplets where one treated individual is matched with two control individuals with the same age, gender, job qualification (blue vs. white collar), level of education, initial investment line ("Money Market Plus", "Growth" etc.). Matched individuals are allowed to serve as a match only once.

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Constant	-0.00560	-0.0760	-0.0107	-0.0352	-0.0265	-0.0286	-0.0217
	(0.220)	(0.399)	(0.220)	(0.221)	(0.222)	(0.221)	(0.222)
Treated x "Money Market Plus"	0.116***	0.116***	0.112***	0.0912***	0.0916***	0.0758***	0.0761***
	(0.0134)	(0.0134)	(0.0139)	(0.0203)	(0.0203)	(0.0212)	(0.0213)
Treated x "Money Market Plus" x Age dev.						-0.00479**	-0.00480**
						(0.00197)	(0.00197)
Treated x "Income"	0.0160*	0.0161*	0.0177**	-0.00197	-0.00185	0.00116	0.00131
	(0.00826)	(0.00826)	(0.00838)	(0.0171)	(0.0172)	(0.0172)	(0.0172)
Treated x "Safety"	0.00464	0.00479	0.00664	-0.0117	-0.0112	-0.00891	-0.00834
	(0.0172)	(0.0172)	(0.0172)	(0.0228)	(0.0228)	(0.0227)	(0.0228)
Treated x "Growth"	2.75e-05	0.000205	-0.00149	-0.0204	-0.0198	-0.0137	-0.0132
	(0.0137)	(0.0137)	(0.0137)	(0.0204)	(0.0205)	(0.0206)	(0.0207)
Treated x Female				-0.00128	-0.00128	-0.00147	-0.00153
				(0.0151)	(0.0151)	(0.0151)	(0.0151)
Treated x White Collar				-0.0217	-0.0219	-0.0214	-0.0216
				(0.0152)	(0.0152)	(0.0152)	(0.0152)
Treated x University Degree				0.0341	0.0341	0.0270	0.0270
				(0.0232)	(0.0232)	(0.0234)	(0.0234)
Treated x High School				0.0421**	0.0420**	0.0374**	0.0373**
				(0.0186)	(0.0186)	(0.0186)	(0.0187)
Treated x No School				0.0244	0.0245	0.0153	0.0155
				(0.0413)	(0.0413)	(0.0414)	(0.0415)
Treated x Central Italy				-0.000665	-0.000519	-0.00105	-0.000917
				(0.0150)	(0.0150)	(0.0150)	(0.0150)
Treated x Southern Italy				0.000934	0.00100	3.92e-05	5.68e-05
				(0.0158)	(0.0158)	(0.0158)	(0.0158)
Treated x Born Abroad				0.0687*	0.0690*	0.0649*	0.0650*
				(0.0385)	(0.0386)	(0.0385)	(0.0386)
Treated x Age Dev.			-0.000849	-0.000600	-0.000604	0.000164	0.000160
			(0.000730)	(0.000759)	(0.000760)	(0.000820)	(0.000821)
Female	-0.00624	-0.0226	-0.0125	-0.0464	-0.0405	-0.0365	-0.0338
	(0.175)	(0.191)	(0.175)	(0.176)	(0.178)	(0.175)	(0.178)
White Collar	-0.0421	-0.210	-0.0845	-0.309	-0.306	-0.243	-0.243
	(0.890)	(1.192)	(0.891)	(0.897)	(0.899)	(0.896)	(0.898)
Age Dev.	0.00156	0.0113	0.00341	0.0119	0.0117	0.00920	0.00911
	(0.0321)	(0.0559)	(0.0321)	(0.0324)	(0.0324)	(0.0323)	(0.0324)
Squared Age Dev.		-0.000427					
		(0.00202)					
Controls: education level (no school, high school, university degree)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls for area of birth (Centre, South, Born Abroad)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls for initial investment line (Money market plus, Safety, Income)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional controls	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Triplet FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,769	2,769	2,769	2,769	2,769	2,769	2,769
R-squared	0.367	0.367	0.367	0.370	0.370	0.372	0.372
F-test	1.147	1.145	1.148	1.149	1.142	1.157	1.150
Prob > F	0.00747	0.00804	0.00732	0.00683	0.00908	0.00475	0.00639

Additional controls: dummy for the birth outside the country, dummies for investment lines and for voluntary extra contributions, years of contribution in deviation from their mean, the number of early withdrawals in deviation from their mean. Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients.

* $p<0.1$; ** $p<0.5$; *** $p<0.01$.

Appendix 1 – Two screenshots of the video lecture